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COMMENTS
THE JONES ACT: THE EMPLOYER AS AN INSURER;
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
DOUGLAS M. FRYER

In Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,1 the United States Supreme
Court categorically rejected negligence as a test of liability under the
Jones Act.' A Coast Guard regulation' relating to the placement of
running lights had not been complied with, the non-compliance being
a cause in fact of death. The Court said:
The question for our decision is whether, in the absence of any showing
of negligence, the Jones Act-which in terms incorporates the provisions of the FELA-permits recovery for the death of a seaman
resulting from a violation of a statutory duty. We hold that it does.
(Emphasis added.) 4
Thus, for the first time the Court has stated what has been apparent
for some time: that proof of negligence, in the common-law sense of
the term, is no longer necessary to recover in a Jones Act suit. This
Comment will attempt to trace the gradual erosion of tort theory as the
standard and the re-establishment of what now seems to be liability
without fault. A constitutional problem raised by this trend has not
as yet been extensively discussed in court opinions.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE JONES ACT

Prior to the Jones Act, a seaman had no cause of action against his
employer or his ship for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow
servant.' After a futile attempt to do away with the fellow-servant rule
in 1915,1 Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones
Act). 7 In substance the act provides that seamen receiving personal
injuries in the course of employment are to have the same right of
action-including a survival action-as that conferred by statute upon
178 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958).
2 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
33 CFR 80.16 (h).
4 78 Sup. Ct. 394, 397

46 U.S.C. § 688 (1925).
(1958).

5 2 NoRmIs, SEANMN § 645 (1952).

6 Seaman's Act of 1915, 38 Stat 1185; it provided that "seamen" having command
should not be held to be "fellow servants" with those under their command. In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co. 247 U.S. 372 (1918), the Court held that the statute disclosed "no intention to impose upon shipowners the same measure of liability ... as the
common law prescribes for employers.., on shore."
741 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1925).
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railway employees.' The statute referred to is, of course, the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA),' which provides the railway employee or his representative with a right of recovery for injuries or death
resulting from the negligence of the agents or employees of the employer." The apparent practical effect of the Jones Act was to cut out
the fellow-servant defense and establish the common-law concept of
negligence as the standard for imposing liability."
In De Zon v. American President Lines" a seaman had his eye removed after an infection had developed during a voyage. No evidence
was presented that immediate treatment would have saved his eye, but
there was conflicting testimony as to whether he should have been
hospitalized in Honolulu when the ship stopped there. The Court held
that damages could be recovered under the Jones Act only for negligence
and that as a matter of law there was no negligence. This holding was
unusually clear in comparison with many later Jones Act decisions and
indicated a construction of the word "negligence" in accord with the
common-law view. The fact that the determination of the negligence
issue was made by the Court makes the case somewhat unique. In
accord with this construction of the Act is PittsburgS. S. Co. v. Palo,
where a seaman was injured while adjusting a steering cable from a
ladder. The court held that, as a matter of law, there was no negligence,
since the defendant could not have foreseen an injury from such cause.
These decisions indicated that, in using the word "negligence" in the
FELA, Congress intended it to mean what the vast number of commons "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law
right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in
case of death of any seaman as a result of such personal injury.., all statutes of the
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in case of railway
employers shall be applicable."
0 Panama Ry. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) (Held-that the FELA was incorporated into the Jones Act).
1035 Stat. 65 1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq. (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et. seq. "Every
common carrier... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he
is employed by such carrier ... or, to his or her personal representative.., for such
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to
its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves or other equipment."
112 NoRms, SEAMEN § 648 (1952).
12318 U.S. 660 (1943).

"364 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1933). Compare United States v. Boykin 49 F.2d 762 (5th
Cir. 1931) (Held-negligence to order a seaman to replace a tarpaulin with a wooden
cover in a hurricane. The court seemingly adopted a common-law test as to whether
there was negligence.).
14 Seavey, Prnciplesof Torts, 56 HAnv. L. REv. 72 (1942).
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law tort cases said it meant: the breach of a duty to avoid creating an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff. 4
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AS A DEFENSE
5 had held that
While the Supreme Court, in PanamaRy. v. Johnson,"
the FELA was incorporated by reference into the Jones Act, and seemingly that the same construction should be used in maritime cases as
was applicable in suits by railway employees, this illusion was dispelled
by The Arizona v. Anelich.' In that case it was held that the plaintiff,
who had been injured while using a fishing vessel's winch known to him
to be defective, could recover in spite of the fact that at that time
assumption of the risk was barred as a defense by the FELA only where
a safety statute had been violated. The Court reasoned that, since
assumption of the risk had never been a defense in the admiralty, it
should not be applied in a Jones Act suit, because the Act merely
brought new rules into maritime law for seamen to recover as "wards
of the admiralty" and that certain rights or limitations on rights as
provided in the FELA for railway employees were not itnended to
extend to maritime suits. It should be noted, however, that the doctrine
denying assumption of the risk as a defense in admiralty suits was developed at a time when the fellow-servant rule barred the seaman from
any recovery for negligence.'8 The case presented the first indication
that the FELA was not entirely embodied in the Jones Act and that
courts had some leeway to impose their own standards for determining
liability.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,"9 (an FELA case) indicated that a
defendant would not be able to argue assumption of the risk under the
guise of no-negligence. At common law, of course, a risk created by the
defendant and assumed by the plaintiff is not an unreasonable risk, and
hence, there is no negligence. But the Court's refusal to tolerate assumption of risk as a defense in any form,"0 demonstrated an apathy
toward technical arguments.
35264 U.S. 375 (1924).

18298 U.S. 110 (1936).
11 The FELA has since been amended to abrogate this defense entirely. 45 U.S.C.

§ 54 (1939).
is GILMORE AND BLAcK, ADmIRALTY 299 (1957).

19 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
20 The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter stated that assumption of the risk
took two forms: (1) When there is negligence, this is no defense. (2) When the
employer could not have avoided the risk through ordinary care, it is a usual risk of
the trade that the employee assumes. This theory has been adopted by a few circuit
court decisions, but the way test (2) is framed it appears that absence of negligence
is the real basis and that this in turn is based upon the employer's adequate care and
not upon a voluntary assumption of a risk he has created.
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INTENTIONAL TORTS UNDER Tm JONES ACT

A seaman intentionally injured by another seaman acting in the
course of employment can recover in an action against his employer on
the basis of respondeat superior without resort to the Jones Act, since
the fellow-servant rule is applicable only to negligence actions." However, because of the necessity of proving that the tort-feas or was acting
within the scope of employment, this burden has become troublesome
at times.22
Two theories have been developed to allow recovery for batteries

under the Jones Act. In Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp. Co.,28 the
mate on the defendant's ship broke up a fight between the plaintiff and
another seaman and ordered the plaintiff to remain on board "until it
blows over." The plaintiff waited for an hour and a half, then was met
and beaten at the gangway by the same man. The court found that
since the Jones Act is to be "liberally" construed, the defendant's
officers were negligent in not preventing the beating. In accord is
Stankiewicz v. United FruitS. S. Corp.,24 where it was held that lack of
discipline on board ship negligently caused the plaintiff's battery.
2 5 where a
The other theory is expressed in Jamison v. Encarnacion,
longshoreman was beaten by his foreman (at a time when longshoremen
could maintain actions as "seamen" under the Jones Act.) The court
held that "negligence" was not to be given its technically restricted
meaning but was to be construed liberally to fulfill the purposes of the
Jones Act and that the foreman was negligent in striking the p!aintiff.
Of course both negligent and intentional torts are based upon fault,
but it requires some mental footwork to find intentional harm within
the concept that is the foundation of the negligence theory: a failure
to recognize the risk created by one's conduct.
However, there may be a limit to recoveries for intentional torts
under the Jones Act. In Forgione v. United States, 6 it was held that
the tort of false imprisonment did not come under the act, since utterly
unrelated to negligence. Perhaps the distinction was founded on the
lack of "impact" in the Forgionecase. Impact at least is a similarity
of both a battery and a negligent tort.
"I Spencer v. Kelly, 32 Fed. 838 (1888) (Held--employer liable to ship-employed
stevedore beaten by mate).
2- Nelson v. American-West African Line, 86 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1936) (Held-the
question, as to whether boatswain was acting in furtherance of his duties in striking
seaman while calling him out for his watch, was one for the jury).
23 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944).
24 123 F. Supp. 714 (D.C. N.Y. 1954).
25281 U.S. 635 (1930).

26 202 F.2d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 1953).
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THE SEAMAN AS THE WARD OF THE ADmIRALTY

Probably the main factor in the liberality of decisions favoring seamen is the judicial policy that they are wards of the admiralty. This
was first expressed in the early case of Harden v. Gordon,2 ' where the
circuit court struck down a provision a seaman had signed in the ship's
articles whereby the ship owner could deduct medical expenses from
wages, reasoning that seamen were a poor and friendless lot and subject
to great hardship. While such conditions do not exist in modern times,
and the maritime unions have reversed the balance of power, the policy
has become even more pronounced, and its influence is a heavy factor
in Jones Act litigation."8
In Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line,2 a seaman died of pneumonia
contracted during a voyage. While the right to maintenance and cure
extends to include recovery for harm caused by failure to provide such
care,30 the cause of action did not survive the seaman's death. In an
opinion by Justice Cardozo, the Court found liability under the Jones
Act, on the theory that failure to render maintenance and cure was
"negligence." There are cases at common law finding an affirmative
duty on the part of an employer to aid an injured employee who had
not been harmed through any fault of the employer. 3' But this doctrine
is not well settled, nor is such a duty expressed in either the FELA or
the Jones Act. Cardozo, instead of relying on the common-law view,
expressed the reasoning of the Court in terms of an attitude. The attitude is that the seaman is a ward of the admiralty, whom the courts
should foster and protect, and that the obligation or duty of the maritime employer was "higher" than that of the shore-side employer. Of
course a "higher duty" test is useful in finding liability only where the
court feels that it would not find liability under the usual standard. As
a test to be given a jury, it has the same questionable utility as "slight
negligence"; the word "duty" is difficult enough to understand without
appending a qualifying adjective.
Several variations of this attitude have been expressed in a multitude
11 Fed. Cas. 480 (C.C. Maine 1823).
See Stumberg, The Jones Act. Remedies of Seamen, 17 OHio ST. L. J. 484
(1956).
27
28

29 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
3D The Troy, 121 Fed. 901 (D.C. W.D. N.Y. 1902) ; Sims i%War Shipping Adminis186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1951).
tration,
8
1 Cary v. Davis, 180 N.W. 889 (1921) ; accord, Anderson v. Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948) (Held--even though employer was not liable for plaintiff's
decedent's falling off the train, a duty existed to aid him in his helpless condition).
Contra, King v. Interstate Consol. St Ry., 23 R.I. 583, 51 A. 301 (1902) ; see also 56
U. PA. L. Rav. 217, 237 (1908).
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of opinions. In Bainbridge v. Merchants & Mining Transp. Co.,82 the
Court said that, since seamen were wards of the admiralty, statutes
enacted for their "benefit" should be liberally construed. Added impetus to this view was given in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith,88 a
decision affirming the Court's position in The Arizona v. Anelich84 as to
assumption of the risk; i.e., that to protect the ward of the admiralty,
the rules of the common law were not to be "harshly" applied; and, for
that purpose, the Jones Act was to be liberally construed.
In an extreme case, McDonough v. Buckeye S. S. Co.,8" a drunken
seaman was sent out on a pier by the wharf guard to return to his ship
in the "care" of a fellow seaman. An altercation arose, and the drunk
fell to the pier and refused to get up. His fellow seaman, unable to lift
him, went to the ship to bring aid, and on return found no one on the
pier. Subsequently the drunken seaman's body was pulled out of the
river. The district court, sitting without a jury, found that a measure
of "speculation and conjecture" was necessary to settle the conflicting
evidence and that, since negligence and causation could be supported
by a liberal construction of the Jones Act, the fellow seaman was acting
for the employer and was unreasonable in leaving the drunk in such a
helpless condition. The result of this case seems to indicate that, no
matter how carelessly a seaman acts toward himself, the employer
must use more than reasonable care toward him.
Although a negligence cause of action under the Jones Act does not
create a maritime lien, 8 in The State of Maryland3 7 the "ward of the
admiralty" policy was seemingly used to create such a lien. Liability
was predicated upon a lack of proper instructions in using an oil burner,
and thus the only cause of action was apparently for negligence. The
court, however, in a rather unclear opinion, found a maritime lien to
exist because it was based upon the "same principle" as the duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel-implying that the cause of action for-unseaworthiness which did create such a lien was not relied upon.
THE BUIMEN OF PROOF

Although at first believed, and still theoretically true that the Jones
Act plaintiff has the burden of showing negligence, 8 it is now doubtful
.32287 U.S. 278 (1932); see also, The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936);
Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp. Co., 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944).
33 305 U.S. 428 (1939); accord, Interocean $.S. Co. v. Topolofsky, 165 F.2d 783
(5th Cir. 1948).
2298 U.S. 110 (1936).
35 103 F. Supp. 473 (1951).
16The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928) ; See RoBiNsoN, AnwImn
406 (1939).
37 85 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936).
38 2 NoRRIs, SEnAxN § 691 (1952).
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that the defendant can rely on this rule. Various concessions have been
made to the plaintiff, until this burden, if it does exist beyond the mere
showing of injury, is at most a light one."
Faith in the Jury. The federal courts have exhibited a boundless
faith in the jury's determination of the negligence issue.4" This was
demonstrated in Gold v. Groves,"1 where a seaman, allowed to hang a
120-pound piece of meat alone, strained himself. The jury was permitted to find negligence on the part of the employer, even though a
stevedore who had been voluntarily helping the seaman was present at
the time the injury occurred, no aid being requested by the plaintiff
for this particular lift. And in Nunes v. FarrellLines,4 2 where a seaman
leaned over a pipe while holding a valve which he broke loose as
ordered, then fell forward, a judgment on a directed verdict was reversed because there was a "possible" inference that the employer was
negligent in not supplying adequate tools.
Justice Black, in Wilkerson v. McCarthy,4' an FELA case, declared
that leaving an issue of negligence to a jury did not make the railway
an insurer and that such an argument was "inadmissible." This, of
course, is true; but while a court can usurp the jury's function and
deprive a party of a right to a jury trial, an even more basic right may
be deprived a party when the court fails to decide an issue it is more
qualified to determine, as when the facts are so clear that the presence
or absence of negligence is a question of law. The abdication of the
duty to decide questions of law denies a party his right to a judicial
proceeding, and to allow the jury to perform this function would ultimately lead to a government of men and not of law."4
Res Ipsa-Loquitur. The common-law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
that where it is more probable than not that negligence caused the injury, negligence can be inferred, 4' has been used by Jones Act plaintiffs
as another means of lightening their burden of proof.
In Johnson v. United States," libellant was pulling slack out of a
tackle when a fellow seaman on the deck above walked forward holding
39 See Gi.molE & BLAcK, ADmmALTY §§ 6-36 (1957).
49 That the jury may be allowed to find negligence in almost any fact pattern was

shown in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521 (1957).
41182 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1950).
4 227 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1955) ; compare Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S.
752 (1942) (Held-jury could have found negligence by employer in supplying a loosejawed wrench. The plaintiff knowingly selected it, and fell eighteen inches when it
slipped).
43 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
44 Sparf,v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
45 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
46 333 U.S. 46 (1948) ; accord, Schulz v. Pennsylvania Ry., 350 U.S. 523 (1956).
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the block on the other end of the tackle. The libellant testified, as sole
witness at the trial, that as he stopped to coil the slack he was somehow
struck on the head by the block his shipmate had been holding. The
case was tried on the admiralty side, and the court found for the
libellant. In sustaining this position, by reversing the circuit court of
appeals, the Supreme Court held that negligence could be drawn as a
"permissible inference" from these facts, since common experience
demonstrated that careful men to not drop a block without being negligent. However, the Court seemed only to examine the facts superficially, since common experience also shows that a man pulling on the
hauling end of a tackle has a distinct tendency to jerk the other block
out of the fellow seaman's control. Although the libellant testified that
he had stopped pulling to coil the line, this circumstance, coupled with
the fact that the libellant was the only witness at the trial, left the court
with little evidence as to causation, certainly short of a preponderance
of the evidence." Nevertheless, a "permissible inference" was allowed
to carry the case. The Jones Act rule for res ipsa loquitur seems to be
that, if the injury could have been caused by negligence, it may be
inferred, and the plaintiff thus has made his prima facie case.4"
CAUSATION

Actual Causation. To sustain recovery on the basis of any sort of
tort liability, a plaintiff must show that the acts of the defendant were

a cause in fact of the plaintiff's harm.' 9 Here also the cases under the
Jones Act have been liberal in finding such causation. An example is
McAllister v. United States,"0 where Chinese longshoremen in the polioinfested port: of Shanghai had been allowed to use the ship's drinking
fountain, toilet facilities, and an exposed latrine constructed for them
on deck. The Supreme Court found this evidence was sufficient for the
trial court to find that these acts caused the libellant's polio condition,
which manifested itself two weeks later-within the normal period of
incubation. However, the libellant had been ashore in Shanghai on a
previous stop that was also within the incubation period.
47 See Justice Frankfurter's dissent, 333 46, 51 (1948).
§§ 6-36 (1957).
48 See GiLMoRE & BLACK, A.Vntm-A
40 PROSsER, TORTS § 44 (1955).
&o348 U.S. 19 (1954) ; compare Cosmopolitan Shipping v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783
(1949). This case, on identical facts, held that a general agent is not an employer
within the meaning of the Jones Act. It reversed the Second Circuit, which had held the
evidence sufficient for the jury to find negligence. McAllister v. Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co., 169 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1948). But in McAllister v. United States, 207 F.2d 952 (2d
Cir. 1953), the instant case discussed above, and the same Second Circuit with three
different judges hearing the case, found the evidence not sufficient to find causation.
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Foreseeability. It is a fundamental theory of tort liability that the
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be observed: i.e.,
there is liability only where the harm incurred is of the type that should
have been foreseeable by the defendant as an unreasonable risk of
harm to the particular plaintiff involved.5' This theory is usually expressed in the shorthand term, "proximate cause."
In cases under the Jones Act where an issue of proximate causation
has arisen, the courts have made it unclear whether the risk theory can
2
ever be argued successfully. In Menefee v. W. R. Chamberlain Co.,
where a seaman who was injured by heavy seas while attempting to
stow a mooring line left on deck for twenty-two days after leaving port
recovered, proximate causation probably did exist; but the court went
further and said that if the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury, it was a proximate cause, citing the FELA
provision that liability exists for "injuries ... resulting in whole or in
part from... negligence. '
This same provision of the FELA was relied upon by the Supreme
Court in a recent FELA decision, Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry.," and
its companion Jones Act case, Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,"
to support the proposition that liability can be imposed where "negligence played any part, however small, in the injury or death."" In the
Rogers case, the Court went on to say that the FELA created a statutory, as distinguished from a common-law, test for negligence. Here
again, "slight negligence" is an undefinable term, as demonstrated by
some of the cases involving gratuitous baileesY7 As with the "higher
duty" concept, the words "slight negligence" by themselves seem to
indicate that negligence is still required but that the courts will be very
liberal in finding it.
This "slightnegligence" test was applied in the Fergusoncase. There,
Ihe second cook, in dishing up ice-cream, found that the scoop he was
using was inadequate to dish out hard ice-cream to keep up with his
51 Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see also 59
A.L.R. 1263 (1929), 56 Hav. L. REv. 72 (1942).
52 176 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1949).

53 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939).
54352 U.S. 500 (1957).
55 352 U.S. 521 (1957). The vigorous and persuasive dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter should be noted, 352 U.S. 518. He argues that the Court should not take
its valuable time to decide questions concerning the weight of evidence in Jones Act
and FELA litigation when the parties have access to appellate review in the circuit
courts. He says the Court should dismiss such writs as improvidently granted and turn
to grave constitutional questions and other issues of major public import.
GO352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957).
57 See PRossER, ToRTs § 688 (1955). Although the concept of slight negligence is

thoroughly rooted in the law of bailments, it has been repudiated elsewhere.

1959]

JONES ACT

orders. He resorted to a butcher knife to chip the ice-cream loose and
injured his hand when it slid off the handle onto the blade. The court
quoted the slight negligence test from the Rogers case and held that the

jury could have found foreseeable harm in the defendant's actions. In
terms of tort theory, this verdict would be expressed thus: failure to
provide an adequate ice-cream scoop or chipper created an unreasonable
risk of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff." The absurdity of this proposition indicates that what the court was really trying to do was to

impose liability for harm that was not foreseeable.
The Kernan Case. The Kernan v. American Dredging Co." case is

the culmination of this long process of judicial legislation. It was a
limitation-of-liability proceeding, in which the respondent denied liability for a tugboat seaman's death caused by a fire of burning vapors
from petroleum products on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia. The
fire was ignited by a kerosene lamp carried at a level of three feet above
the water, instead of eight feet as required by a Coast Guard regulation, 0 its being at the lower distance being a cause in fact of the fire.
Relying on some FELA cases' that imposed liabiltiy for violations of
the Safety Appliance Acts6" or the Boiler Inspection Act, " the Court
found liability to exist because of the breach of the regulation, in spite
of the fact that the purpose of the regulation was to avoid collisions
and not to avoid petroleum fires.
Imposition of liability because of the violation of a statute under
tort negligence theory requires the causing of the type of risk that the
statute was intended to prevent.8 " This requirement was laid down by
the leading case of Gorris v. Scott," where a statute required separate
pens for animals carried on a vessel. Sheep carried without separate
pens on the deck of defendant's ship were washed overboard, but since
the statute was intended primarily as a sanitation measure, no liability
was imposed. In the Kernan opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated that this test did not apply, since negligence was not
5
8Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) ; see also Seavey,
Principlesof Torts, 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 72 (1942).
1578 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958).
00
33 CFR § 80.16 (h).
6
1 Louisville & N. Ry. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v.
Gotscball, 244 U.S. 66 (1917) ; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239 (1923) ; Swinson v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 294 U.S. 529 (1935) ; Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S.
520 (1949) ; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
8227 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1952).
6336 Stat. 913 (1911), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1952).
64 See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72 (1942); RESTATEmENT,
ToRTs § 286 (c) (1934), note comment on clause (c).
6L R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874).
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required in a Jones Act suit where a statutory regulation was violated.
The FELA cases"8 relied on by the Court did impose liability where
there was a violation of either the Safety Appliance Acts8 7 or the Boiler
Inspection Act, "' though the harm did not fall within any risk either
statute sought to prevent.
Even if the basis for these cases is wrong, their doctrine probably is
too well settled now to be effectively disputed in a FELA case; but the
applicability of this construction of the FELA in a Jones Act suit
seems questionable. Prior to the Jones Act, in The Eugenie F. Moran,"'
two scows were under tow, neither had the required running lights,
and the first scow collided with a car float. The Court held that, since
the light on the second scow was to prevent collision with itself only,
the second scow could not be liable in an in rem proceeding. Clearly,
if this case is taken to profess the admiralty doctrine, it is in conflict
with the cases under the FELA allowing recovery for injuries not
within the risk. It would seem, therefore, by virtue of the principle of
The Arizona v. Anelich, supra, that the construction of the FELA
should not be incorporated by reference into the Jones Act since
inconsistent with the maritime law.
There is another weakness in applying the cases under the FELA
that allow recovery for injuries outside the statutory risk, as precedent
in a Jones Act suit. In these cases, there is a strong implication that
the Court intended such liability to be imposed only for violations of
the Boiler Act or the Safety Appliance Acts. This was indicated in
Uric v. Tkompson, 0 where the two acts were referred to as "if not in
form amendments... [They] cannot be regarded as statutes wholly
1'
separate.., from.., the [FELA]
The majority, in Kernan, rejected both the view that the FELA cases
should not be relied on as contrary to maritime law, and the view that
the previou imposition of liability was intended to be restricted to the
specific railway statutes. The court held that that: (1) the Jones Act
provides the same cause of action granted to railway employees, including that cause of action as "judicially developed"; and (2) the
underlying principle of the FELA is to impose liability for harm caused
by the non-compliance with any statute.
6

See cases cited note 61 supra.

727 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
6836 Stat. 913 (1911), as amended, 45 U.S.C.

69212 U.S. 466 (1909).

70337 U.S. 163 (1949).
71

§§ 1-16 (1952).

§§ 22-34 (1952).

See Justice Harlan's dissent in the Kernan opinion, 78 Sup. Ct. 394, 402 (1958).
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Where an injury is not foreseeable, the law of torts imposes no liability, even under the theory of absolute liability for ultra-hazardous
activities."2 In fact, the law of torts seems to restrict laibility more
narrowly within the limits of the risk created where there is absolute
liability than where there must be fault.7 3 Thus, the Kernan opinion
seems to apply a broader basis for imposing liability than absolute
liability is imposed under tort law; the employer is being held as the
insurer of seamen. 7"
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

To sustain a recovery under the Jones Act, the FELA requires that
the injury be inflicted in the course of employment. 5 Here, the courts
have expanded the basis for imposing liability by broadening the scope
of employment. The drunken seaman in McDonough v. Buckeye S. S.
Co., supra, who was walking out the pier to the ship, was in the course
of employment, even though the employer had no control over him or
the fellow seaman returning to the ship with him.
The case of Nowery v. Smith 6 demonstrates that a seaman may be
in the course of employment, for the purpose of recovery under the
Jones Act, merely from the fact of having signed the ship's articles. In
that case, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for an assault and battery
inflicted by a fellow seaman in a Cuban bar room. The court reasoned
that the seaman was in the course of employment, since relaxation and
shore leave are a part of the seafaring life. The court relied on Aguilar
v. Standard Oil Cn..7 1 where the seaman's remedy for maintenance and
cure was extented to cover shore-side activity.
There is, however, an apparent distinction between the remedy for
maintenance and cure and a Jones Act remedy. Maintenance and cure
72 Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wn.2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954) ; see Harper,
Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MicH. L. REv. 1001 (1932).
7 PROSSER, TORTS § 338 (1955).
7,The Supreme Court in Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 78 Sup. Ct. 758 (1958), an
FELA case, relied on the Kernan opinion to impose liability on an employer on a
vicarious liability theory though the tort was committed by an independent contractor.
The case indicates that the Court's approach to these cases may not be hampered by any
of the traditional common-law limitations on liability. Although the case was not
brought under the Jones Act, the authority of Cruse v. Sabine Transp. Co., 88 F2d
298 (5th Cir. 1937), applying the common-law view, seems definitely weakened.
7 2NORRIS, SEAMEN § 691 (1952).
7 69 F. Supp. 755 (1946), affirned, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947). The trial court's
instructions were, in substance, that the plaintiff could recover if it was shown that:
(1) he was in the course of employment; or (2) that the ship's master knew or should
have known of the fellow seaman's vicious disposition. Of course, if the jury found

(1) to have been shown, they could have found for the plaintiff without any further
showing at all, under these instructions.
77318 U.S.

724 (1943).
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has always been strict liability and is necessary to insure some medical
care of seamen in foreign ports where other aid may be unavailable.
The Jones Act, accepting the most liberal view, was intended to provide
recovery for hazards of the shipping industry." A barroom brawl can
hardly be said to be such an industrial hazard. Even where recoveries
are allowed under workmen's compensation statutes, the injury must be
within the general class of harm the statute was designed to protect.
For example, an assault arising from a dispute not pertaining to work
would not be within a statute providing recovery for injuries "arising
out of and in the course of employment.'""
Is A WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE POSSIBLE

As seen, the cases under the Jones Act have tended toward strict
liability without any of the restrictions of tort law. In situations where
plaintiffs have failed, they have had intrinsically vulnerable positions,
as where a ship failed to turn back on a reciprocal course eleven hours
after the seaman was found missing; 0 or where a chambermaid stooped
over to pick up a dresser and injured her back; 81 or where a seaman
desired to go ashore and, knowing that there was no ladder overside to
the dock, jumped and injured himself; "2 or where a drunken seaman
who presented a danger to the crew in the engine-room was handcuffed
and confined; "8 or where a wiper was injured by the ship's rolling him
into standard engine-room equipment." These cases at least illustrate
the imagination of counsel in trying to extend Jones Act liability, and in
the future it may be so extended, as the last barriers to complete insurance for the injury are broken down. This seems apparent from an
examination of the cases denying liability, in which the judicial attitude
of "ward of the admiralty" is given at least lip service, indicating perhaps a reluctance of the courts to deny liability on any basis, 8 though
they felt bound by the precedent of well-established common-law
principles to do so.
78 Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958).
79 Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MicH. L. REv. 1001
(1932).
80 Miller v. Farrell Lines, 247 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1957).
81 McLeod v. Union Barge Line, 95 F. Supp. 336, affirmed, 189 F.2d 610 (3d Cir.
1951).
s2 Jackson v. Pittsburg S.S., 131 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1942).
83
Escandon v. Pan American Foreign Corp., 88 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1937).
8
4 Lake v. Standard Fruit & S.S., 185 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1950) ; see also The Ballantrae, 208 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1953); Benton v. United States Towing, 120 F. Supp.
638 (1954), affirmed, 224 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Adamowski v. Gulf Oil Corp., 93
F. Supp. 115 (1950), aflirmed, 197 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Buford v. Cleveland &
Buffalo S.S., 192 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1951).
85 See Lake v. Standard Fruit & S.S., 185 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Escandon v. Pan
American Foreign Corp., 88 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1937).

19591

JONES ACT

The solution to the problems of continued high cost to the shipping
industry, the expensive and time-consuming process of bringing a
lawsuit to the employee, and the uncertainty of the law to both parties,
would seem to be a system of workmen's compensation. While tort
liability is based upon fault-for purposes of deterrence and punishment, as well as for providing a recovery for loss, with a weighing of
these factors against freedom of action 8 -- workmen's compensation is
something quite different. It is, rather, a scheme to provide an equitable distribution of the hazards of industry, by which the worker is
insured against loss and in return gives up his cause of action against
the employer."
However, as a result of cases like Kernan, it is doubtful that seamen
will ever accept a workmen's compensation scheme. Not only does
absolute liability seemingly exist under the Jones Act, but the seaman
has a cause of action for unseaworthiness of the vessel by which the
employer is absolutely liable8 8 and a cause of action for maintenance
and cure that is more liberal than any workmen's compensation statute.8" Thus, while the railway employee has but one opportunity for
recovery, and because of the liberal interpretation of the FELA, might
be reluctant to relinquish the probability of a large verdict in favor of
assurance of a lesser sum, the seaman has all of this and two other bites
at the cherry. In addition, the "higher duty" and "ward of the admiralty" policies make the seaman's chances of recovery even greater
under the Jones Act than the railway worker's under the FELA.
JUDIcIAL.

LEGISLATION

It is fairly apparent that "negligence" under the Jones Act is not
the same concept that exists at common law. In the process of gradual
change, the courts have used their prior decisions, not only as authority
for more liberal construction, but as a basis for asserting that present
congressional intent is in accord with the trend because Congress has
not seen fit to amend the act or substitute a workmen's compensation
scheme for it."0 Moreover, a definite distinction was made between
statutory and common-law negligences in Rogers v. MissouriPac. Ry.,
supra, an FELA case, and in its companion Jones Act case, Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, supra, which adopted the reasoning of the
Rogers opinion. The Court in the Rogers case felt that the necessity
81 Seavey, Principlesof Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942).

Comment, One if by Land, Two if by Sea, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 489 (1952).
8Mahnich v. Southern S.S., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
89 Comment, One if by Land, Two if by Sea, 30 TEXAs L. REv. 489 (1952).
O0See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957).
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of reviewing many lower court decisions was occasioned by a failure
to recognize this distinction as a part of the congressional scheme for
liberal interpretation. However, the FELA, incorporated by the Jones
Act, establishes negligence as the test of the liability,9 and nothing in
either act creates even an inference that "negligence" does not mean
what a legion of cases at common law had interpreted it as meaning."2
Clearly then, the courts, in finding liability without negligence, have
been acting outside the scope of the statute.
The Kernan opinion identified the basis for this judicial legislation.
Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority, did not rely on judicial
fiat; nor did he rely on authorization by Congress to exercise the admiralty decisional power to fashion principles for affording relief,"
which power, of course, would not have existed under the FELA, where
the court would be limited by the statute itself.94 But he based the
ability of the Court to go beyond the meaning of the words of the
statute upon a power given by Congress to fashion remedies as demanded by industrial conditions. He expressed this feeling in these
words:
Rather, by using generalized language, [Congress] created only a
framework within which the courts were left to evolve, much in the
manner of the common law, a system of principles providing compensation for injuries to employees consistent with the changing realities
of employment in the railroad industry. (Emphasis added.) 95
Thus, the Court is purportedly acting by virtue of a rule-making
power given it by Congress, to amend the FELA and establish standards
to govern future conduct. This is not an exercise of judicial power, as
it is not the declaration and enforcement of legal rights and duties as
they exist on present facts, but rather the fashioning of rules by which
such legal rights and duties may be enforced thereafter; " this is, rather,
a legislative function. By virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers,
the courts cannot be vested with a power not given to them by the
Constitution. 7 One aspect of this principle was expressed in the early
9135 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq. (1939).
92 See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 352 U.S.
500, 518 (1957), and Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 518 (1957),
and his dissenting opinion in Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 394, 405
(1958).
93 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, "The judicial power shall extend ...
to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;..."
94 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases ... arising
under... the laws of the United States." (Emphasis added.)
95 78 Sup. Ct. 394, 400 (1958).
96
Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913).
9
7 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 60 (1803).
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case of United States v. Todd,98 where the Court held that the power
to examine pension claims and certify their opinions to the Secretary
of War, attempted to be conferred on the circuit courts by the Act of
1792, was not judicial but, rather, legislative power and therefore an
unconstitutional delegation of such power.
A similar problem has often been raised in the field of administrative
law, where delegations of legislative power to the executive or to an
administrative agency have been struck down because there was a lack
of an adequate standard of limitation. 9 Whether such standards of
limitation would validate a delegation to the courts seems doubtful, as
judicial power is expressly conferred upon the courts by the Constitution, 0 0 and the administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature.
This distinction was made by Chief Justice Marshall in Waymen v.
Southard,"1 where he expressed the view that a delegation of exclusively
legislative powers to the courts could not even be contended, but that a
delegation to "others" of powers that Congress itself could rightfully
exercise was a different matter.
Assuming that such a delegation could be made if adequate standards
were established, it is doubtful that any such standards have in fact
been laid down by Congress to limit the Supreme Court's purported
rule-making function. If "negligence" is not such a limiting standard,
then clearly the Court feels it has the power to go beyond the meaning
of any of the words. And of course the actual existence of such a power
to be derived from the statutory language is certainly a novel concept.
There is nothing in either the Jones Act or the FELA to indicate that
Congress intended such a result. Reliance must be placed upon the
liberal judicial interpretation of the statutes and congressional lethargy
in failing to provide a workmen's compensation scheme, to support such
a result.
It seems, therefore, that if the courts have been acting outside the
scope of the statute and were actually exercising a legislative function,
they were acting without power, at least in the technical sense. Whether
this absence of power is meaningful is not clear, as the Supreme Court,
which has authorized such a function, is the one tribunal not subject to
judicial review on any basis.
98 54 U.S. (13 How.) 52 (1794), report contained in a note by Chief Justice Taney
to United States v. Ferreria, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851).
99Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
100 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
101 10 Wheat. 1, 15-16 (1825).

